Information and the Control of Productive Assets

Matthew Rabin

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: adverse selection; moral hazard; bargaining; theory of the firm; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-07-01
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Journal Article: Information and the Control of Productive Assets (1993)
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