Contracting Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach

Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Katz ()

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: incomplete contracts; renegotiations; remedies for breach contract; Business; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Business and Corporate Communications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-05-01
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Working Paper: Contracting Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach (1991)
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