Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments

Michael Katz ()

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: agency; precommitment; renegotiation; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-07-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (233)

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Journal Article: Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments (1991)
Working Paper: Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments (1991)
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