Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise

Jeff Dayton-Johnson and Pranab Bardhan

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: To analyze the effect of asset inequality on cooperation within a group, we consider a two-player noncooperative model of conservation of a common-pool resource (CPR): a fishery. We give necessary and sufficient conditions such that conservation is a Nash equilibrium, and we show that increasing inequality does not, in general, favor full conservation. However, once inequality is sufficiently great, further inequality may push the players closer to efficiency. Thus the relationship between inequality and economic efficiency is U-shaped. We analyze the implications for conservation if players have earning opportunities outside the commons. Finally, we consider various schemes of community regulation of the commons in the light of the noncooperative model with or without exit options. We find that increases in inequality may restrict the range of implementable mechanisms.

Keywords: collective action; common property; exit options; inequality; international economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-06-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Inequality And Conservation On The Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise (2002)
Working Paper: Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt7f9913w9

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