NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games

Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: repeated gains; folk theorem; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987-04-02
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Related works:
Journal Article: Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games (1990)
Working Paper: Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains (1988)
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