Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation

Gary Charness and Matthew Jackson

University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play, with payoffs playing a primary role in equilibrium selection when individuals play, but the structure of the voting rule playing the primary role when groups play. We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments.

Keywords: Groups; Networks; Game Theory; Equilibrium Selection; Equilibrium Refinement; Majority Voting; Group Play; Robust-belief Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3wd3q7qz.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation (2007)
Working Paper: Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation (2004)
Working Paper: Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation (2004)
Working Paper: Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt3wd3q7qz

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().