Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in Giving

Zachary Grossman

University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: I investigate the relative importance of social-signaling versus self-signaling in driving giving. I derive specific qualitative predictions about how the response of an image-motivated dictator to a change in the probability that her choice will be implemented depends crucially on the information available to the relevant observer. A probabilistic dictator-game experiment tests the joint, relative, and independent effects of self-signaling and social-signaling. The results provide little evidence of self-signaling, but stronger evidence of social-signaling, particularly in a large subsample that excludes likely `selfish types'.

Keywords: charitable giving; altruism; dictator game; self-image; self-signaling; signaling; beliefs-dependent preferences; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

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