An Experiment on Nash Implementation

Gary Charness, Antonio Cabrales and Luis Corchon

University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: We perform an experimental test of a modification of the controversial canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism successfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time, providing empirical evidence for the feasibility of such implementation. In addition, the performance is further improved by imposing a fine on a dissident, so that the mechanism implements strict Nash equilibria. While our environment is stylized, our results offer hope that experiments can identify reasonable features for practical implementation mechanisms.

Keywords: Implementation; Experiments; Mechanisms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-06-13
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Journal Article: An experiment on Nash implementation (2003)
Working Paper: An experiment on Nash implementation (1998)
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