BARGAINING EFFICIENCY AND SCREENING: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

Gary Charness

University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: This paper investigates whether information about generosity or fairness can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. Subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, with a dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reduces dispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargaining efficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial for these differences and also strongly affects the relative bargaining success of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.

Keywords: bargaining; fairness; screening; dispute cost; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-09-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining efficiency and screening: an experimental investigation (2000)
Working Paper: Bargaining efficiency and screening: An experimental investigation (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt86r0x2tf

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