Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly

Kjell Lommerud (), Odd Rune Straume and Lars Sørgard

University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: We examine how a merger a ffects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it can be more profitable totake partin amergerthan being an outsider. For firm-specific unions, on the other hand, results are reversed.

Keywords: mergerprofitability; trade unions; endogenous wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-05-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly (2001)
Working Paper: Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly (2000)
Working Paper: Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly (2000)
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