Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly

Sørgard, Lars and Kjell Lommerud ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Odd Rune Straume and Lars Sørgard

No 2738, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under Cournot competition in differentiated products. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than to be an outsider. For firm-specific unions, on the other hand, results are reversed.

Keywords: Merger profitability; Trade unions; Endogenous wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly (2000)
Working Paper: Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly (2000)
Working Paper: Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly (2000)
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