Reciprocity, Matching and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games

Rachel Croson, Enrique Fatas () and Tibor Neugebauer

No E2004/32, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional cooperation). Consistent with previous research, we find that participants in the voluntary contribution mechanism attempt to match the contributions of others in their group. We also examine participants in a related game with different equilibria, the weakest-link mechanism. Here, in contrast, participants contribute so as to match the minimum contribution of others in their group.

Keywords: Experimental economics; public goods; voluntary contribution mechanism; weakest link mechanism; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D44 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://public.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es/pdfs/E200432.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to public.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es:80 (nodename nor servname provided, or not known)

Related works:
Journal Article: Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games (2005)
Working Paper: Reciprocity, Matching and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_32

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces c/ Bailén 50. 41001 Sevilla. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Susana Mérida ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).