Reciprocity, Matching and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games

Rachel Croson, Enrique Fatas () and Tibor Neugebauer

IESA Working Papers Series from Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research

Abstract: Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional cooperation). Consistent with previous research, we find that participants in the voluntary contribution mechanism attempt to match the contributions of others in their group. We also examine participants in a related game with different equilibria, the weakest-link mechanism. Here, in contrast, participa nts contribute so as to match the minimum contribution of others in their group.

Keywords: experimental economics; public goods; voluntary contribution mechanism; weakest link mechanism; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-reg
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Related works:
Journal Article: Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games (2005)
Working Paper: Reciprocity, Matching and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esa:iesawp:0409

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