Strategic Games Modles of Economic Integration

H Haller and Yannis Ioannides

CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: We set up two country games to express strategic aspects of economic integration, where integration requires overcoming fixed costs in the form of a vector of resources, the two countries' agents' characteristics are diverse, and each country's contribution is subject to strategic choice. Individual agents' payoff depend, for any given trade allocation rule, on how integration costs are shared. We show existence of equilibrium and explore the properties of the game. A number of examples demonstrate that autarky or a multiplicity of Nash equilibria, some of which are Pareto rankable, are possible outcomes. We also explore certain strategic aspects of economic integration of the three country case.

Date: 1995-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0208

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