The Impact of Employment Tax Cuts on Unemployment and Wages: The Role of Unemployment Benefits and Tax Structure

Christopher Pissarides

CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: I model and simulate the effects of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages in four equilibrium models: competitive, union bargaining, search and efficiency wages. I find that if the ratio of unemployment compensation to wages is fixed, the effect of the tax cut is mainly on wages. But if income out of work is fixed in real terms, there are substantial employment effects. When wages are determined by bargaining, revenue-neutral reforms that make the tax more progressive also reduce unemployment. Thus, policy towards unemployment compensation and tax structure are key influences on the effect of taxes on unemployment.

Date: 1997-08
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Related works:
Journal Article: The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure (1998)
Working Paper: The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages: the role of unemployment benefits and tax structure (1997)
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