The 'Emulator Effect' of the Uruguay Round on US Regionalism

Marco Fugazza () and Frederic Robert-Nicoud

CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: Using a detailed data set at the tariff line level, we find an emulator effect of multilateralism on subsequent regional trade agreements involving the US. We exploit the variation in the frequency with which the US has granted immediate duty free access (IDA) to its Free Trade Area partners across tariff lines. A key finding is that the US has granted IDA status especially on goods for which it had cut the multilateral MFN tariff during the Uruguay round the most. Thus, the Uruguay Round (multilateral) 'concessions' have emulated subsequent (preferential) trade liberalisation. We conclude from this that past liberalisation sows the seeds of future liberalisation and that multilateral and preferential trade agreements are dynamic complements.

Keywords: Regionalism; multilateralism; stumbling bloc; Uruguay round (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 F15 N70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The “Emulator Effect” of the Uruguay Round on US Regionalism (2014)
Working Paper: The 'Emulator Effect' of the Uruguay Round on US Regionalism (2010)
Working Paper: The 'emulator effect' of the Uruguay round on US regionalism (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0973

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