Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logicallyconnected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgmentaggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op-posite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, weconstruct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation andprove Arrow's theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proofof Arrow's theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow's theoremin judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preferenceaggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.

JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2007)
Working Paper: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2005)
Working Paper: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2005)
Working Paper: Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stipep:13

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