Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op- posite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow’s theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.

JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2005-10
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19295/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2007)
Working Paper: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2005)
Working Paper: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2005)
Working Paper: Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:19295

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