Read My Lips: The Political Economy of Information Transmission

Timothy Besley and Rohini Pande

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: The paper studies credible information transmission by governments. A group of heterogenous individuals have to make private investment and labour supply decisions while relying on the government for information about investment returns. The government consists of an elected citizen who chooses a redistributive strategy in addition to providing information. We give conditions under which the outcome leads to over- or under-investment in high-return activities and the outcome is Pareto efficient.

Keywords: Political economy; cheap talk; redistribution; development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/te/te355.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission (1998)
Working Paper: Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:355

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