Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission

Timothy Besley and Rohini Pande

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: The paper studies credible information transmission by governments. A group of heterogenous individuals have to make private investment and labour supply decisions while relying on the government for information about investment returns. The government consists of an elected citizen who chooses a redistributive strategy in addition to providing information. We give conditions under which the outcome leads to overor under-investment in high return activities and the outcome is Pareto efficient.

Keywords: Political economy; cheap talk; redistribution; development. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H10 H23 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1998-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2169/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Read My Lips: The Political Economy of Information Transmission (1998)
Working Paper: Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:2169

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