Dynamic Voting in Clubs

Kevin Roberts

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterised. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analysed in detail.

Keywords: cooperatives; local public goods; majority voting; median voter; organization size; partnerships; trade unions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic voting in clubs (2015)
Working Paper: Dynamic voting in clubs (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:367

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