Dynamic voting in clubs

Kevin Roberts

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterised. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analysed in detail.

Keywords: Cooperatives; local public goods; majority voting; median voter; organization size; partnerships; trade unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D92 H41 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 1999-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19349/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic voting in clubs (2015)
Working Paper: Dynamic Voting in Clubs (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:19349

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