Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge

Sudipto Bhattacharya, Louis-André Gérard-Varet and Claude d'Aspremont

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge, between two participants in a R & D race or contest, for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licensing fee schedules, as functions of the 'amount of knowledge' disclosed by the leading to the lagging agent, are considered. Conventional results, on delays in bargaining and surplus sharing in private goods environments, are sharply modified by the public good nature of innovation, and by the fundamental nonconcavity of payoffs with respect to disclosure of interim research knowledge.

Date: 1996-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge (1996)
Working Paper: Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:/1996/293

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().