Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge

d’ASPREMONT, Claude (), Sudipto Bhattacharya and Louis-André Gérard-Varet
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d’ASPREMONT, Claude: Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Claude d'Aspremont

No 1996012, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge, between two participants in a R&D race or contest, for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licensing fee schedules, as functions of the "amount of knowledge" disclosed by the leading to the lagging agent, are considered. Conventional results, on delays in bargaining and surplus sharing in private goods environments, are sharply modified by the public good nature of innovation, and by the fundamental nonconcavity of payoffs with respect to disclosure of interim research knowledge.

Date: 1996-04-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge (1996)
Working Paper: Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge (1995)
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