Equilibria in Multi-unit Auctions

Michal Bresky

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: The paper shows the existence of a pure strategy Nash equlibrium for a general class of multi-unit auctions. The seller offers k identical units of goods and sets the minimum accepted bid (reservation price). Any bidder has an arbitrary distribution of values for the units on which they submit up to k bids. The class of games includes uniform-price, pay-your-bid, all-pay and Vickery auction as polar cases. The conditions for the existence of a pure weakly increasing strategy equlibrium are specified, and the essential equilibrium properties are discussed.

Keywords: Multi-unit auction; multiple-object auction; existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games; all-pay; pay-your-bid and uniform-price auction with reservation price. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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