Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights

Dirk Engelmann and Veronika Grimm ()

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.

Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions; Demand Reduction; Experimental Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS - AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION AND SOME THEORETICAL INSIGHTS (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cer:papers:wp210

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