Tying by a Non-monopolist

Eugen Kovac

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: This paper explores tying in the situation where a multi-product firm without monopoly power competes against several single-product firms. I consider two markets: one for a horizontally differentiated good, the other for a homogeneous good. As opposed to the widely accepted opinion that tying may be profitable only in the case of monopoly power, I show that under reasonable assumptions tying is profitable for the multi-product firm and has a negative welfare effect.

Keywords: Industrial organization; Anti-trust policy; Multi-product firm; Tying; Bundling. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cer:papers:wp225

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