Strategic Tariff Protection, Market Conduct, and Government Commitment Levels in Developing Economies

Delia Ionaºcu and Kresimir Zigic ()

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: We analyze a simple “tariffs cum foreign competition” policy targeted at enhancing thecompetitive position of a domestic, developing country firm that competes with its developed country counterpart on the domestic market and that carries out an innovative (imitative) effort. We evaluate this policy with respect to social welfare, type of oligopoly conduct, information requirement, time consistency, possibility of manipulative behavior and conclude that the most robust policy set-up is that in which the domestic government is unable to precommit to the level of its policy. Finally, we examine this policy, allowing for asymmetric information, and show that the corresponding social welfare may be higher than under perfect

Keywords: Optimal tariff protection; Government non-commitment regime; Innovative(imitative) effort; Symmetric versus asymmetric information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-int
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