Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders

Michal Bresky

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: The paper examines a general class of multi-unit auctions. The class of games investigated includes uniform-price, pay-your-bid, all-pay and Vickrey auctions as special cases. The seller offers k identical units of goods and sets the minimum accepted bid. Bidders have atomless valuation distributions and they submit up to k bids. For this class, the existence of Nash equilibrium in a measurable strategy space and weakly increasing pure strategy space is proven. In many cases any equilibrium strategies can be modified in such a way that they form a pure strategy equilibrium. Properties of standard strategies in multi-unit auctions are analyzed.

Keywords: Multiple-unit auction; existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games; all-pay; pay-your-bid and uniform-price auctions; auctions with reservation price. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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