A Note on Equilibrium Uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn Model

Levent Celik and Bilgehan Karabay

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: The Baron-Ferejohn multilateral bargaining model predicts a payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in which players' equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. In this note, we present a modified version of the Baron-Ferejohn model by introducing veto players and provide a sufficient condition to obtain a truly unique SSPE in terms of payoffs as well as players' equilibrium strategies.

Keywords: multilateral bargaining; equilibrium uniqueness; veto players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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