Creating a Winner's Curse via Jump Bids
David Ettinger () and
Fabio Michelucci ()
CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague
We show that jump bids can be used by a bidder to create a winner's curse and preserve an informational advantage that would otherwise disappear in the course of an open ascending auction. The e ect of the winner's curse is to create allocative distortions and reduce the seller's expected revenue. Two novel features of equilibrium jump bids are also derived. First, the jump bid may partially reveal the value of the signal that the jump bid intends to hide. Second, the probability of calling a price might decrease with the type of the bidder who places the jump bid.
Keywords: auctions; efficiency; jump bids; winner'scurse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids (2016)
Working Paper: Creating a winner's curse via jump bids (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cer:papers:wp537
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