Trade, Insecurity, and the Costs of Conflict

Michelle Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos ()

No 10033, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Typically, economics assumes that property rights over productive resources or goods are perfectly defined and costlessly enforced. The costs of insecurity and the resultant conflict are, however, real and often economically significant. In this paper, we examine how international trade regimes affect the costs of conflict and, in turn, how the desirability of international trade is affected by these costs. We consider both domestic and international conflict. Trade openness reduces the costs of these types of conflict for countries that import goods whose production relies on supplies of contested resources. For countries that export such goods, trade openness intensifies conflict. The effect of conflict on the allocation of productive resources through prices under trade can also explain the “natural resource curse” and can overturn a country’s natural comparative advantage. Finally, we consider alternative channels through which trade can affect arming and conflict costs, with effects that can either improve or worsen international relations.

Keywords: insecure resources; trade openness; the gains from trade; domestic conflict; interstate conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D30 D70 D74 F10 F51 F60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Working Paper: Trade, Insecurity, and the Costs of Conflict (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10033

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