A Unifying Theory of Foreign Intervention in Domestic Climate Policy

Juan Moreno-Cruz and Anthony Harding

No 10172, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We propose a theory of climate-policy motivated foreign intervention to study different forms of international climate governance in the presence of power imbalance. Foreign countries have at least three options to intervene in another country’s domestic climate policy: i.) Agreements with Extraction; ii.) Agreements with Transfers; and iii.) Agreements with Sanctions. We distill the fundamental properties of different climate policy options into a simple parameterization and examine the incentivizes and preferences for each type of foreign intervention. We find that the preference for the type of foreign intervention depends critically on the policy externality of different domestic climate policies.

Keywords: climate change; mitigation; adaptation; geoengineering; international environmental agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q54 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: A Unifying Theory of Foreign Intervention in Domestic Climate Policy (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10172

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