Honesty Nudges: Effect Varies with Content but Not with Timing

Benoît Le Maux and Sarah Necker

No 10221, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We use a ten-round online mind game to determine whether the effect of honesty nudges depends on timing and content. Reminding individuals about the right thing to do increases honesty. Including information that it is possible to assess an individual’s dishonesty strengthens the effect of the intervention. Both types of intervention are similarly effective when they take place before an individual has made any decision or after individuals have played five rounds of the mind game. Nudging an individual after they have made five decisions allows us to add personalized information based on the individual’s previous response; however, this does not increase honesty. Examining the reaction to nudges based on previous behavior shows that (presumably) honest and dishonest individuals respond by reducing overreporting. The effect of the different nudge content is driven by those previously dishonest.

Keywords: dishonesty; lying; cheating; honesty nudge; moral reminder; deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 J28 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Honesty nudges: Effect varies with content but not with timing (2023)
Working Paper: Honesty nudges: Effect varies with content but not with timing (2023)
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