Firm Training

Dan Black, Lars Skipper, Jeffrey A. Smith and Jeffrey Andrew Smith
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jeffrey Andrew Smith

No 10268, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Workers acquire skills through formal schooling, through training provided by governments, and through training provided by firms. This chapter reviews, synthesizes, and augments the literature on the last of these, which has languished in recent years despite the sizable contribution of firm training to the overall stock of worker human capital. We engage with research on the determinants of receipt of firm training, the effects of firm training on workers outcomes, and various policy debates related to firm training, including training taxes, training subsidies, non-compete agreements, and the minimum wage. Our discussion emphasizes the complex measurement issues associated with firm training and the interplay of applied theory and applied econometrics in the related empirical literature.

Keywords: training; human capital; firm; worker; classroom; learning by doing; monopsony; minimum wage; training tax; non-compete (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 I24 J24 J31 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lma
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