Property Rights to the World’s (Linear) Ocean Fisheries in Customary International Law

Scott Barrett

No 10567, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: I model the ocean as an array of lines set within a two-dimensional frame, and show how the Exclusive Economic Zone emerged as an equilibrium in customary international law. I find that custom codifies the efficient Nash equilibrium of enclosure for nearshore fisheries. For highly migratory and offshore fisheries, enclosure is inefficient, and customary law supports a more efficient “free sea” regime. The model also identifies the trigger for changes in property rights and the reason choice of a particular limit, like the current 200-mile zone, is arbitrary. In an asymmetric, regional sea, I find that the scope of the EEZ is determined by the relative power of coastal and distant water states, and need not be efficient. Finally, I find that proposals to nationalize the seas or ban fishing on the high seas are neither efficient nor supportable as equilibria in customary law.

Keywords: customary international law; exclusive economic zone; ocean fisheries; closure of high seas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F55 K33 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-gth and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10567

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