Why are Small Firms Different? Managers’ Views

Jonas Agell

No 1076, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Do incentives in small organizations differ from those in large ones? This paper uses a representative survey of compensation managers to shed light on the issues. I find that (i) small establishments rely less on pecuniary incentives, and have a significantly more hostile attitude towards incentive schemes based on competition and relative rewards; (ii) large units are more vulnerable to mechanisms of efficiency wages, effects that remain even as I control for differences in monitoring ability; (iii) large units are more prone to indicate that negative reciprocity is important, and that their employees care about relative pay. I argue that these findings fit with behavioral stories of incentives and motivation, in particular those stressing group interaction effects, inequity aversion and gift exchange.

Keywords: -size effect; motivation; relative pay; field-survey; matched data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Why are Small Firms Different? Managers’ Views (2004)
Working Paper: Why are Small Firms Different? Managers' Views (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1076

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