Restructuring the ECB
Helge Berger (),
Jakob de Haan,
Robert Inklaar and
Jakob de Haan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jakob de Haan
No 1084, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
Soon, euro area membership could more than double, with the vast majority of accession countries being quite different in economic terms compared with current members. Under the current decision-making system, this can lead to high decisionmaking costs and there is a risk that monetary policy could deviate from the targets specified in the Maastricht treaty. While centralization might be a “first-best” solution to these problems in many ways, there are possible disadvantages from a political economy perspective, including a potential conflict with the established voting rights of current euro area member countries. An alternative solution to ensure the European perspective of decision-making in the ECB Council is to match economic size and voting power. One way to implement this principle is a rotation scheme for national central bank governors that takes economic differences between the member countries into account. The paper discusses various rotation schemes, also with a view to the decision-making cost argument.
Keywords: European Central Bank; centralization of monetary policy; EMU; transition countries; accession countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1084
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