Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth

Daniel Haile, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Harrie A. A Verbon

No 1105, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A new line of theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes the pivotal role of fair institutions for growth. We present a model, a laboratory experiment, and a simple cross-country regression supporting this view. We model an economy with an unequal distribution of property rights, in which individuals can free-ride or cooperate. Experimentally we observe a dramatic drop in cooperation (and growth), when inequality is increased by a selfserving dictator. No such effect is observed when the inequality is increased by a fair procedure. Our regression analysis provides basic macroeconomic support for the adverse growth effect of the interaction between the degree and the genesis of inequality. We conclude that economies giving equal opportunities to all are not likely to suffer retarded growth due to inequality in the way economies with self-serving dictators will.

Keywords: inequality; corruption; weak institutions; growth; intentions; dynamic public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-exp, nep-law and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Self-serving dictators and economic growth (2008)
Working Paper: Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth (2003)
Working Paper: Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1105

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