A Theory of International Boycotts

Abdoulaye Ndiaye

No 11267, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Calls to boycott a foreign country aim to push a share of domestic consumers to cut their consumption of goods imported from the targeted country. How do boycotts differ from sanctions? Should boycotters target all of the country’s products, or should they focus on a restricted set of sectors? I answer these questions in a canonical Ricardian model. The model allows me to determine the optimal targeted boycott strategies and trace out the Pareto frontier of the domestic boycotters’ and foreign country’s welfare.

Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-inv
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