Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes

Gregory S. Amacher, Erkki Koskela and Markku Ollikainen

No 1131, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Keywords: illegal logging; royalty design; penalty schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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