The Causal Impact of the Electoral System on Corruption

Abel François, Nicolas Lagios and Pierre-Guillaume Méon

No 11328, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We estimate the causal effect of the electoral system on corruption by leveraging a specificity of the French electoral law where the electoral system for municipal councils depends on municipal population. Specifically, municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants use an individual majority system, while those above this threshold use a proportional list system. Exploiting that discontinuity in a regression discontinuity design and using survey and actual corruption data, we find that the proportional list system results in higher levels of perceived and actual corruption than the individual majority system.

Keywords: corruption; electoral systems; local government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11328

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