Non-Preferential Trading Clubs

Pascalis Raimondos () and Alan Woodland

No 1145, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a nonpreferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between these countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these member countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. These tariff reforms are chosen to maintain world prices at their pre-club levels and, in this respect, the trading clubs act in a Kemp-Wan-like manner. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare. Open regionalism is an example of such trading arrangements.

Keywords: trading clubs; non-preferential tariff reform; open regionalism; Kemp-Wan proposition; customs unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Non-preferential trading clubs (2006)
Working Paper: Non-Preferential Trading Clubs (2006)
Working Paper: Non-Preferential Trading Clubs (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1145

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