Assortative Mating and Couple Taxation: A Note

Giacomo Corneo

No 11643, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: An often neglected implication of couple taxation is its impact on marital sorting. A tractable model of such an impact is offered in this paper. It reveals that, as compared to joint taxation with income splitting, individual taxation makes higher-ability individuals more picky in the marriage market, which translates into a higher degree of economic homogamy in society. Furthermore, a shift from joint to individual taxation is predicted to reduce the average quality of marriages in the population.

Keywords: economic homogamy; assortative mating; couple taxation; tax unit; progressive income tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp11643.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11643

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().