Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets

Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt

No 1168, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Irrespective of the level of trade barriers, the equilibrium contract adopted by each manufacturer is shown to decrease domestic welfare as compared to the other possible contract when products are close substitutes.

Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-reg
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Related works:
Journal Article: Exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets (2006)
Working Paper: Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1168

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