Peer Evaluation Tournaments

Martin Dufwenberg, Katja Görlitz and Christina Gravert

No 11720, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Peer evaluation tournaments are common in academia, the arts, and corporate environments. They make use of the expert knowledge that academics or team members have in assessing their peers’ performance. However, rampant opportunities for cheating may throw a wrench in the process unless, somehow, players have a preference for honest reporting. Building on Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg’s (2018) theory of perceived cheating aversion, we develop a multi-player model in which players balance the utility of winning against the disutility of being identified as a cheater. We derive a set of predictions, and test these in a controlled laboratory experiment.

Keywords: psychological game; cheating; tournaments; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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