Public GoBs

Daniel Heyen and Alessandro Tavoni

No 11736, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: GoBs are goods for which agents have non-monotonic preferences: more is beneficial only up to an ideal level, beyond which additional quantities become undesirable. We analyze public GoBs (non-excludable and non-rival) through a theoretical framework applicable to diverse contexts such as solar geoengineering, wildlife management, and defense spending of European countries. The private provision of public GoBs proves inefficient due to both free-rider and free-driver externalities. Contribution costs and heterogeneity in ideal levels determine equilibrium outcomes. Surprisingly, reducing contribution costs can decrease welfare when agents' preferences diverge significantly.

Keywords: private provision of public goods; GoBs; heterogeneity; externalities; free-riding; free-driving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D62 H23 H41 Q54 Q59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11736

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