Political Bias in the Media – Evidence from the Universe of French Broadcasts, 2002-2020

Julia Cagé, Moritz Hengel, Nicolas Hervé and Camille Urvoy

No 11741, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: How does the media bias the news? And in particular, how much does it cost owners to ensure that journalists comply with their stance? We compile a unique dataset of journalists and guests appearing on French television and radio shows between 2002 and 2020 to quantify the role played by journalist selection and compliance in political coverage. First, we leverage the movements of thousands of journalists between media outlets, and estimate a model in which the share of coverage for each political group is determined both by journalist and outlet components. We find that outlet-level decisions account for three-fourths of the differences in political coverage; in contrast, journalists’ personal editorial preferences play only a minor role. Second, we examine how journalists respond to a major takeover-induced editorial change. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we show that while many journalists left in response to the shock, those who stayed largely adapted to the new editorial direction. Notably, exploiting unique data on journalist salaries, we show that this compliance came at nearly no cost for the new owner, reflecting journalists’ low bargaining power in an industry in crisis.

Keywords: media bias; slant; journalists; media ownership; media concentration; pluralism; media capture; news organizations; wage compensation; monopsony power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J40 L15 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11741

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