The Value of Worker Rights in Collective Bargaining

Benjamin W. Arold, Elliott Ash, W. Bentley Macleod () and Suresh Naidu

No 11766, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper proposes novel natural language methods to measure worker rights from collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) for use in empirical economic analysis. Applying unsupervised text-as-data algorithms to a new collection of 30,000 CBAs from Canada in the period 1986-2015, we parse legal obligations (e.g., “the employer shall provide...”) and legal rights (e.g., “workers shall receive...”) from the contract text. We validate that contract clauses provide worker rights, which include both amenities and control over the work environment. Companies that provide more worker rights score highly on a survey indicating pro-worker management practices. Using time-varying province-level variation in labor income tax rates, we find that higher taxes increase the share of worker-rights clauses while reducing pre-tax wages in unionized firms, consistent with a substitution effect away from taxed compensation (wages) toward untaxed amenities (worker rights). Further, an exogenous increase in the value of outside options (from a leave-one-out instrument for labor demand) increases the share of worker rights clauses in CBAs. Combining the regression estimates, we infer that a one-standard-deviation increase in worker rights is valued at about 5.7% of wages.

Keywords: worker rights; collective bargaining; natural language processing; employment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 J32 J52 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: The Value of Worker Rights in Collective Bargaining (2025)
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