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The Effect of Network Degree on Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from the Field

Ben D'Exelle, Christine Gutekunst and Arno Riedl

No 11832, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We conduct an artefactual field experiment in real-existing trade networks to analyze how individual network degree affects bargaining demands and outcomes. We combine data from a bilateral bargaining experiment with data of trade networks in 24 villages in Uganda. To identify the effect of individual degree in the village trade network we experimentally vary the disclosure of participants’ identities in a bargaining pair. We derive hypotheses on how degree should affect behavior and find partial support for them. Specifically, we observe that individual degree affects bargaining demands in the predicted direction when one of the bargainers is informed about the network positions but not when both sides are informed. Moreover, network degree affects the likelihood of agreements and earnings, irrespective of the knowledge of the network positions of bargaining partners.

Keywords: bargaining; social networks; network degree; experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C90 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-net
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